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Abstract
To tackle the ubiquitous cybersecurity threats, a few
countries have enacted legislation to criminalize the
production, distribution and possession of computer
misuse tools. Consequently, online hacker forums,
which enable the provision and dissemination of
malicious cyber-attack techniques among potential
hackers or technology-savvy users, are subject to
censorship. This project examines the mixed impacts
of online hacker forum censorship on users’
contribution to protection discussion through a
natural experiment with large-scale content analysis.
We find that while the enforcement indeed reduced the
discussion on malicious cyber-attacks, the discussion
on cybersecurity protection could increase or
decrease in different scenarios. The rationale is that
while the online hacker forum censorship imposes risk
to the discussion of malicious attacks, it also reduces
the potential benefit from discussing protection issues.
Policy implications are discussed.

1. Introduction
Cyber-attack refers to any offence against the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer
data and systems and can range from installing
malware on a computers, intruding into or illegally
controlling computer information systems to
attempting to destroy the infrastructure of entire
nations. Cyber-attacks cost the global economy
billions of dollars every year, and are growing
concerns for businesses and governments around the
world [16,21]. One reason for the flooding of
cybersecurity violation events is the low cost to
acquire the necessary tools and programs to commit
cyber-attacks. For example, the online hacker forums
enable the communication among potential hackers or
technology-savvy users and provide the free-to-access
and rich resources on malicious attack techniques. To
tackle the ubiquitous cybersecurity threats, a few

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41840
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-0-2
CC-BY-NC-ND

Meng-Ke Qiao
National University of
Singapore
mengke@comp.nus.edu.sg

countries have enacted legislation to criminalize the
production, distribution and possession of computer
misuse tools. Table 1 provides a list of such countries.
Consequently, online hacker forums with the
provision and dissemination of malicious attack
techniques, are subject to censorship. Banning
malicious attack discussion is supposed to increase
the knowledge barrier and to reduce the chance
of committing cyber-attacks.
Table 1. Countries with legislation on the
production/distribution/possession of
computer misuse tools
Legislations on the production
/distribution /possession of
computer misuse tools
Canada
Criminal code, Article
China
Criminal Law
Criminal code, Amended Section
Latvia
244.
Italy
Penal code, Amended Article 615
Criminal code, Amended Article
Lithuania
198
Qatar
Penal code, Part 3 Article 382
Republic of Moldova Telecommunication Law, Article 66
Russian Federation Criminal Code, Act 273 and 138.1
Saint Lucia
Criminal Code, Article 330, 331
Country

While few opponents would rise against the
regulation on disseminating bomb making information,
the same rationale may not be expected to malicious
attack discussion. The ambiguous opinions towards
the dissemination of malicious attack techniques are
rooted in the distinctions between conventional crimes
and cyber-attacks. First, malicious attack discussion
plays a dual role in protection and attack [29]. For
example, the port scanners and exploit tests are
powerful instruments for network administrators to
detect their information system vulnerabilities, and at
the same time the detected vulnerabilities could be
exploited by hackers to commit cyber-attacks. In fact
the endless combat between cyber-attacks and its
countermeasures becomes the driving force for the
advancement of defensive technology. Second, the
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community, as the perpetrators against cyber security,
from its origins in 1960s, were considered the “Heroes
of the Computer Revolution” [20]. Through decades
of migration, hacker community have become a
congregation of the “white hats”, “black hats” and
“gray hats”. The white hats have commitment to
information freedom, mistrust of authority, and
heightened dedication to meritocracy. The black hats
are engaged with forbidden actions including mockery,
spectacle, and transgression. The gray hats participate
in both black and white domains [10]. Thus it is lack
of a clear moral judgment about hackers. Lastly, the
loss rendered by cyber-attacks is largely intangible and
hard to measure. All of the aforementioned factors
contribute to the debate on online hacker forum
censorship. In this study we address a straightforward
question:
What is the impact of banning malicious attack
discussion on users’ contribution to protection
discussion in online hacker forums?
The answer to this question is not straightforward
given the intertwining of contesting and conquering
between malicious attack discussion and protection
discussion. Banning malicious attack discussion is
supposed to increase the knowledge barrier and to
reduce the chance of committing cyber-attacks. On the
other side, lack of the alert from malicious attack
discussion, forum users may become less interested or
poorly motivated to attend protection discussion. If
banning malicious attack discussion discourages the
contribution on protection discussion and thus reduces
the public’s awareness of potential threats and
technical measures against malicious attack, its role in
deterring cybersecurity threats may not be well
justified. Instead banning malicious attack discussion
on online hacker forums may force the black hat back
to the underground hacker communities, thus making
the potential cybersecurity threats invisible to the
public and hence hard to be tackled.
We investigate the research question in the context
of the Chinese online hacker forums. On Feb 28,2009,
China government enacted the Amended Article 285
in the Criminal Law which states that “Whoever
provides programs or tools specially used for intruding
into or illegally controlling computer information
systems, or whoever knows that any other person is
committing the criminal act of intruding into or
illegally controlling a computer information system
and still provides programs or tools for such a person
shall, if the circumstance is serious, be punished under
the preceding paragraph”.1 Following the enforcement
of this amendment, the Internet security agencies in
China conducted intensive censorship to online hacker

forums. Forum administrators also removed
considerable amount of posts containing malicious
techniques and regulated the forums with strict rules
and surveillance on user-generated contents. As a
result, the number of posts on malicious attack in each
of our studied two forums has significantly dropped
from then onwards. We examine the change of the
number of posts on protection before and after the
enforcement of the Amended Article 285 at the forum
aggregate level and the user group level. Innovative
text mining and content classification techniques have
been applied into the data processing.
We find that while the enforcement indeed reduced
the discussion on malicious cyber-attacks, the
discussion on cybersecurity protection could increase
or decrease in different scenarios. The rationale is that
while banning discussion the online hacker forum
censorship imposes risk to the discussion of malicious
attacks, it also reduces the potential benefit from
discussing protection issues.
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 is
about the related literatures. Section 3 introduces the
context of this study. In section 4, we describe our
classification method. Section 5 reports the empirical
analysis and estimation results. Section 6 concludes
the study with discussion about implication and
limitation.

2. Related literature
This study is related to three streams of research in
the literature including hacker behavior, Internet
regulation, and hacker forum text analysis.

2.1. Hacker behavior
Hackers can be classified as white hats or black
hats based partly on their intents and the potential
criminal nature of their activities. Individuals who
attempt to hack into computer systems and ruin the
systems are referred to as black hat hackers;
individuals who attempt to protect the computer
systems are known as ethical hackers or white hat
hackers [27].The earliest white hats can be traced back
to the late 1960s with the belief that computers can be
the basis for beauty and a better world [20]. Following
the growth of white hats, black hats evolved from the
telephone phreakers to the computer hackers [10].
However, the white hats and black hats are not so
distinct from each other. White hat hackers could
simulate the attacks used by black hat hackers in order
to test potential security risks and understand how to
defend against them [9]. Black hat hackers can be

1 http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-02/28/content_1246438.htm
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recruited to develop security software or to provide IT
security consultancy service [4]. And there exist the
gray hat hackers who lie between the white and black
hats, committing to security by hacking into the
political territory [10]. Hence, the moral judgment
about hacker is ambiguous.
Hacker’s moral ambiguity is consistent with their
communications in online hacker forums. The
participants in hacker forums discuss issues about both
malicious attack and protection. They may post stepby-step guide to help others conduct malicious attacks,
e.g. SQL injection, web exploits, and decryption [6].
Exploit tools or malwares are also available as
attachments, e.g. the Dirt Jumper DDos attack,
keyloggers and crypters [25]. They also discuss
technologies, methodologies and practices about
detecting, preventing and tracking the black hats to
protect information assets.
Being aware of the moral ambiguity among
hackers, to the best of our knowledge, no previous
work has addressed the interdependency between
white hats and black hats.

2.2. Internet regulation
A number of countries have enacted policies to
regulate the Internet which enables the generation,
communication and dissemination of both benign and
malicious content. They block access to the Internet
content and websites which are harmful to the public
[2]. For instance, the contents about hate speech are
restricted by the France government [5]. Websites
threatening national security are blocked in South
Korea and Pakistan [11]. The creation of hacking tools
is considered a criminal offense in the United
Kingdom and Germany. On Feb 28, 2009, China has
enacted the Amended Article 285 of its Criminal Code
which criminalizes the provision of hacking tools or
programs. The neutrality pertaining to information
technology leads to the debate on regulation. For
example, encryption has the potential to further
massive terrorism and facilitate greater security in
communication. Thus some of the law enforcement
communities advocate its criminalization but others
stand by accessing to the technology [18]. In our case,
hackers are two-sided, playing positive and negative
roles in cybersecurity, and sharing both malicious
attack and protection knowledge. Due to law
enforcement, some black hats may quit from the
censored online hacker forums. As a result, forum
users may become less interested in contribution
simply due to the shrinking group size [30]. And lack
of the alert from malicious attack discussion, forum
users may become less interested or poorly motivated
to attend protection discussion. It’s unclear whether

forbidding malicious attack discussion forfeits their
contribution to protection discussion [18]. Hence, it is
important to figure out what impact banning malicious
attack discussion could have on the contribution to
protection discussion.

2.3. Hacker forum text analysis
Different from the underground hacker
communication channel, i.e., ICQ, where the
observations are limited by personal contacts, hacker
forums are the publicly accessible hacker communities
where the vast amount of user-generated content can
be investigated in a longitudinal base. However, unlike
online product review where the user-generated
content is structured or semi-structured, the
unstructured and diversified contents in hacker forums
impose great challenge to quantitative analysis. Most
of the relevant text analysis studies are focused on
uncovering the dark side of the mysterious group.
Abbasi et al. [1] use an interaction coherence analysis
(ICA) framework to identify expert hackers in forums.
Samtani et al. [25] apply classification and topic
modeling techniques to investigate the functions and
characteristics of assets in hacker community. In order
to have better understanding of hacker terms and
concepts, Benjamin et al. [8] utilize recurrent neural
network language models (RNMLM) to model
language. To the best of our knowledge, no previous
work has distinguished the hacker forum posts by
hackers’ intents of either malicious attacks or
protection. Thus posts on protection are mostly
ignored.
In this study, we classify posts into three categories,
malicious-attack, protection, or the irrelevant through
supervised machine learning. With human-labeled
training datasets, we use n-gram, weight, together with
information gain [26, 24] to generate and select
features, then feed them into Naive Bayes and SVM
classifiers. We choose Naive Bayes and SVM as the
classifiers because they are classical and can be
adopted in many occasions. SVM also often reported
best performance in many previous online text
classifications [31]. At last, classifiers with good
precision and recall rate are used to label the remaining
posts.

3. Context and Theory Discussion
3.1. Hacker forums
With the consideration on popularity, established
period, the theme of the forum and major topics, we
choose forum A and forum B among the most
representative hacker forums in China as the research
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subjects, and investigate the impact of banning
malicious attack discussion on participants’
contribution to protection discussion. According to the
web traffic ranking by Alexa.com, Forum A and
Forum B are ranked the second and third respectively
in the Chinese hacking category. 2 The No.1 forum,
established in 2008, cannot provide a balanced
longitudinal dataset with enough time periods before
and after the enforcement of the Amended Article 285.
Forum A was established in March 2001, one of the
earliest and most famous hacker forums in China. It
aims to cultivate hackers with advanced knowledge
and techniques and hence has long enjoyed a great
popularity. Different from forum A, Forum B,
established in December 2002, aims to raise people’s
awareness of cyber security and to provide related
services. Posts on either malicious attacks or
protection are found in both forums, perhaps due to the
ambiguous roles of hackers. But the different value
propositions have resulted in more discussion on
malicious attacks in Forum A and more discussion on
protection in Forum B.

3.2. The Amended Article 285 in the Criminal
Law of People’s Republic of China
On Feb 28,2009, Chinese government enacted the
Amended Article 285 in the Criminal, which states
that “Whoever provides programs or tools specially
used for intruding into or illegally controlling
computer information systems, or whoever knows that
any other person is committing the criminal act of
intruding into or illegally controlling a computer
information system and still provides programs or
tools to such a person shall, if the circumstances are
serious, be punished under the preceding paragraph”.
The enforcement of this amendment has generated
widespread and substantial impacts on the online
hacker forums in China. First, the Internet security
agencies in China conducted intensive censorship to
online hacker forums. The chief administrator of
forum A was even arrested and sentenced to five-year
prison. Second, to comply with this law, many hacker
forum administrators implemented a series of
regulations to forum participants, including deleting
posts on malicious attack, promulgating more rigorous
content censorship and alerting those participants who
disseminated malicious attack discussion and tools in
online forums. Given the dual usage of hacking
techniques and the ambiguous incentives of hackers, it
is not clear how the law enforcement against malicious
attack discussion will indirectly affect the participants’
contribution to protection discussion.
2

3.3. Theory Discussion
We use the volume and ratio of posts to measure
forum users’ contribution on discussion, as the ratio
can offset any change in the overall contributions
across the whole forum. Our hypotheses are based on
three main effects resulted from the law enforcement.
Displacement effect. Displacement effect in this
study means that forum users who would have
attended discussion on malicious attack may instead
choose to discuss protection issues. This is related to
the communication and technical interests pertaining
to the participants in the hacker forums. First,
meritocracy is emphasized in their active area [12,13]
and hackers acquire reputation which accumulated
from their activity levels and post quality [7]. For
successful hackers, they do feel the need to brag and
share their accumulated knowledge [12, 17]. Second,
hackers are technology savvy while both hacking and
protection share the same technical foundation.
Considering the risk of discussing malicious attacks,
they may convert discussing hacking knowledge into
discussing protection knowledge, and continue to
launch posts on protection, in order to keep active and
accumulate their reputation in forums. As a result,
banning malicious attack discussion may lead to more
posts on protection.
New user effect. As the hacker forums become
more protection oriented, it would attract new users
who are interested in protection techniques. As a result,
there would be more white hats in hacker forums than
before. Thus the amount of posts on protection and the
ratio of posts on protection to all posts would increase.
Both displacement effect and new user effect
support the positive effect of banning malicious
attacks discussion on the contribution of protection
discussion. Thus we expect the number of posts on
protection increases after the law enforcement and the
extent of increase is larger than the other irrelevant
posts in the forum.
Precaution reduction effect. Posts on malicious
attack may raise the precaution awareness and
stimulate the discussion on protection issue. The law
enforcement deters forum users from discussing
malicious attack, and a large number of posts on attack
were deleted by forum administrators. This may
reduce the attention and interests on protection issues.
Therefore, the volume and ratio of posts on protection
may decrease.
Hence, what impact could banning malicious
discussion and tools have on posts on protection is a
pending question subject to empirical test.

In Alexa.com, hacking is listed as one of the sub-categories in Computers. Ranking was assessed on April 5, 2016
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4. Data processing
4.1. Definition of intents
For the purpose of our research, we classify the
intents of posts into three categories. The first is
“malicious attack”, which means the post contains
malicious attack intent, expressing a tendency to
attack others; the second is “protection”, which is
about measures of protecting personal or company
(information, account) from being attacked by
malicious hackers; the third is “irrelevant”, for those
neither related to “malicious attack” nor to
“protection”. Through a thorough study on hacker
forum posts, we summarize the typical topics of each
category in Table 2. After defining the specific
contents in each category, text classification is needed
to label each post accordingly.
Table 2. Typical Topics and Post Examples
Malicious attacks

Typical Topics
footprinting and reconnaissance, scanning networks,
enumeration, system hacking, Trojans and back- doors,
viruses and worms, sniffers, social engineering, denial of
service, session hijacking, hacking web servers, hacking web
applications, SQL injection, hacking wireless networks,
evading IDS, IPS, firewalls, and honeypots, buffer overflow,
and cryptography
Post Examples
Postid=52972, “Recently, I scanned out a ROOT blank
command of a host MSSQL, how can I get the host’s
administrator right”
Postid=3045218, “Numerous ways to surf internet for free in
internet bar”!!!!!
Protection
Typical Topic
How to defense from hackers’ attacks, including installation
and setting of firewall, closing certain ports
Post Examples
Postid=2754943, “Help….My computer has been infected by
virus.”
Postid=3228449, “Share: How to protect IP from being stolen”
Irrelevant
Typical Topic
Other contents that are not relevant to attack or defense. For
example, basic computer operation, chatting, advertisement
Post Examples
Postid=26837, “How to run DOS under windows 2000 ”
Postid=2808442, “Good news! Tencent is celebrating 6th
anniversary now, 6 digit QQ number can be applied for free.
Apply for it soon!”

4.2. Text classification
The whole text classification process is presented
in Figure 1. Since a leading post represents the topic
of a whole thread, we constrained our samples to all of
the leading posts in the two forums. Two human
annotators, also as the co-authors of this study,
independently labeled 18833 leading posts out of the
140802 leading posts in Forum A and 5459 leading
posts out of the 28317 leading posts in Forum B. Both

of them including one postgraduate and one senior
undergraduate, are majored in information systems,
and have received more than six-month training on the
domain knowledge of information security and hacker
communities before working on labeling. Their interrater agreement, using kappa statistics, is 0.778 for
Forum A and 0.92 for Forum B, which suggests
sufficient inter-rater reliability. We then use the
labeled dataset as the training dataset and testing
dataset.
The next step is to preprocess these unstructured
texts. Unlike English, Chinese does not have space
between words. So we first need to segment each
sentence into tokens via Rwordseg provided in R.
Meanwhile, stop words, useless in this classification
task, are removed. We then use N-grams to generate
more features. To select features, we give higher
weights on post title and use information gain to filter
out less important features while reserving those that
are more useful in discriminating posts [15, 19]. Then
these feature sets are used to train Naive Bayes and
SVM classifiers. Following classifier training, we use
10-fold cross validation to evaluate the performance of
the classification. Finally, for each sub forum,
classifiers with the best performance are applied to
labelling the remaining posts.

Figure1. Hacker forum text classification
process
The classification is implemented by Rapidminer
with performance reported. For Forum A, the average
precision, recall and F1-measure of three classes are
86.36%, 80.11% and 82.73% respectively; For forum
B, the average precision, recall and F1-measure of
three classes are 77.83%, 71.23% and 74.24%
respectively. Since no previous study has classified the
intents of posts in hacker forums, no existing
benchmark could be applied. Referring to a recent
study which identified users’ intents in online health
forum using word vector and SVM in text
classification [28], their average precision, recall and
F1-measure of all classes are 49.77%, 48.44% and
48.78% respectively.

5. Model and empirical analysis
5.1. Model and description
We address our research question at both aggregate
level and user level. Model 1 at the aggregate level
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investigates how the daily volume (ratio) of posts on
protection (PoP) changes with the law enforcement
(the banning of malicious attack discussion).
𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐸𝑡 + +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡
+𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
(1)

where t denotes date t, 𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑡 is the daily amount of PoP
in a forum , 𝐸𝑡 indicates the enforcement of the
amended Article 285. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 is a vector
consisting of the daily number of post users and the
daily number of new users, to control the impact of
forum group size on post contribution [30].
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 captures the time trend. 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑡 is the first
order lag of the dependent variable. Excluding ratios,
all variables are converted to the logarithmic form.
The Heckman model is employed to analyze the
impact of the law enforcement on the ratio of
protection posts. We calculate the ratio as the amount
of PoP over the total amount of PoP and irrelevant
posts. The malicious attack posts are excluded from
the denominator as they have been seriously
manipulated following the law enforcement. Further
the first stage of the Heckman model can capture the
impact of the law enforcement on the probability of
posting or not posting. In order to correct the selection
bias due to no leading post in a forum at some days,
we calculate the inverse Mills ratio based on the
estimation result in the first step, and incorporate it
into stage 2. The Heckman model is specified as
following,
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆𝟏: 𝐼𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 (2)
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆𝟐: 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐸𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑆𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡
(3)

In equation (2), 𝐼𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable that
equals to 1 if at least one post was posted at day t, and
0 otherwise. 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑡 is the first order lag of the total
amount of posts. In equation (3), 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑆𝑡 is a vector of
the first order lag of the daily amount of PoP and the
total amount of posts. Other variables have the same
meanings as in equation (1).
Model 2 at user level investigates the change of the
users’ contribution to protection posts before and after
the law enforcement. We constrain the subjects to
users who joined the forum before Feb 28, 2009 and
assort users with the same joining date into one group.3
To ensure the symmetric time window before and after
the enforcement date for each group, we drop groups
who joined the forum before 2005. We finally get 1842
groups for Forum A and 1217 groups for Forum B. For
each group, their time windows before and after the
law enforcement equal to the number of days between
their joining date and the enforcement date. For

example, for a group of users who joined the forum in
Jan 1, 2009, the number of days before the law
enforcement is 58 days. Thus we only check their
contributions within 58 days after the law enforcement.
We check how the number of PoP by group i change
before and after the enforcement date using a fixedeffect model,
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐸𝑡 +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

(4)

where t equals to 0 for the time window before the
enforcement date and 1 otherwise. We use the other
groups’ total amount of posts/replies on protection and
total amount of irrelevant posts/replies to control for
any impact due to the forum size and peer influence.
Same as model 1, when the dependent variable is the
ratio of PoP, the Heckman model is applied.
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆𝟏: 𝐼𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (5)
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆𝟐: 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐸𝑡 +
(6)
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑡

We derive the inverse Mills ratio from stage 1 and
incorporate it into stage 2. In stage 2, besides those
control variables in stage 1, vector 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡
also includes the amount of group users and the length
of time window to control for the effects due to group
size and time interval. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report
summary statistics for main variables used in model 1
and model 2 respectively.

5.2. Forum aggregate level analysis
The columns 1-3 and 4-6 in Table 4 report the
regression results of model1 for forum A and forum B
respectively. In Column 1 and Column 4, the
coefficient of the law enforcement for Forum A is
positive and significant while it is negative and
significant for Forum B. These results seem
conflicting with each other but are reasonable given
the different positioning of Forum A and Forum B. As
introduced in Section 3.1, Forum A aims to cultivate
hackers with advanced knowledge and techniques
while Forum B aims to raise people’s awareness of
cyber security and provide related services. Hence
banning the malicious discussion increases the
perceived risk for the black hats in Forum A but at the
same time reduces the perceived benefit for the white
hats in Forum B. Consequently, the displacement
effect explains the positive and significant coefficient
of the enforcement indicator for Forum A while the
precaution reduction effect explains the negative and
significant coefficient of the enforcement indicator for
Forum B.

3

We group users by joining dates because the size of individual level data is too big. There are 159626 unique users in forum A and 37307
unique users in forum B. In our next stage of this research, we will conduct individual-level analysis.
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For Heckman model, both of the results in Column
3 and Column 6 show that the ratio of the PoP
increases significantly after the law enforcement. This
suggests that banning malicious attack discussion
generates relatively more positive effect on protection
discussion than discussion on issues irrelevant with
attack and protection. However, referring to Column 2,
the coefficient of the enforcement indicator is negative
and significant while it is negative and insignificant in
Column 5. This difference further suggests the distinct
responses of users in Forum A compared to those in
Forum B. Combining the results in Columns 1,2,4 and
5, it shows after the law enforcement, users in Forum
A which consisted of more black hats relative to White
hats, choose to either keep mute or discuss protection
issues. Differently, in Forum B which consisted of
more white hats relative to black hats, users may keep
posting but the total number of PoP reduced.

5.3. User group level analysis
By splitting users into groups based on joining date,
we are able to examine the change in amount and ratio
of PoP at group level, in particular for old users who
joined the forums before the enforcement. Table 5
reports the regression results of model 2. Generally,
the results of model 2 are consistent with that of model
1 presented in Table 4, i.e. the coefficients of the
enforcement indicator in columns 1-5 of Table 5 are
significant, with the same sign as the corresponding
specifications reported in columns 1-4 of Table 4. The
main difference is that the negative effects of banning
malicious attack discussion on general discussion, in
particular for discussion on protection, becomes more
salient in model 2, e.g., columns 2,6,7 and 8 in Table
5. These evidences together with results in columns 2,
5 and 6 of Table 4 further clarify that the increasing
ratio of PoP as reported in column (6) of model 1 is
mainly due to the contribution from new users who
joined Forum B after the enforcement.
To explain the distinct results from data in Forum
A and Forum B, we conduct a paired t-test to compare
the daily number of PoP posted by old and new users
in Forum A and Forum B respectively. Table 6 shows
that on average, users in Forum B contribute more PoP
than users in Forum A, which suggests the systematic
difference of user profiles in the two forums. Further,
the mean number of PoP posted by new users in Forum
B is much more than that of PoP posted by old users,
which further suggests that the positioning of Forum
B effectively attracts more white hats than forum A

6. Conclusion and implications

Combining the statistics in Table 6 with the
regression outcomes, we can conclude that while
banning malicious attack discussion imposes risk to
the discussion of malicious attacks, it also reduces the
potential benefit from discussing protection. Thus the
black-hat hackers may respond to the enforcement by
switching to discussing protection topics; while the
white-hat hackers become less motivated to discuss
protection issues. As a result, the impact of online
hacker forum censorship is a mix which depends on
user profile in each forum.
Internet censorship is a very important and
sensitive issue to policy makers. This study shows that
the bad guy and good guy may not be always
substitutes to each other. Instead they are
interdependent and their boundaries may become
ambiguous due to technology neutrality and the ethical
ambiguity pertaining to hacker community. In
particular, we find that banning malicious attack
discussion discourages the contribution on protection
discussion by the white hats. On the other side, to
reduce the probability of being punished, the black
hats may approach the underground hacker
communities for discussing malicious attacks. Thus
the potential cybersecurity risk imposed by malicious
cyber-attack discussion does not really reduce but just
becomes less observable. This is an even worse
situation since the public become less alerted about the
potential threats and are also less aware about the
technical countermeasures against malicious attacks.
Hence, the role of the online hack forum censorship in
deterring cybersecurity threats may not be well
justified. Instead of banning malicious attack
discussion in online hacker forums, our study proposes
that the authorities should encourage more discussion
about the disclosure of cyber-attack threats and their
countermeasures. Banning the bad guys does not
attract and help good guys, but pushes the devil to the
dark.
This study can be improved through at least three
ways. The first is to improve the performance of text
classification through in-depth machine learning. The
second is to broaden the coverage of hacker forums in
order to capture any interdependence and enhance its
generalizability. Lastly the current empirical model
should be improved by including individual level
analysis.
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Model 1
Forum

Variable

Mean
3.651

PoP

A

B

Pre-enforcement
Std.dev.
Min
3.428
0

Max
20

Mean
0.983

Post-enforcement
Std. Dev.
Min
1.405
0

Max
16

Ratio of PoP

0.040

0.028

0

0.194

0.032

0.049

0

0.4

No. of post users
No. of new users
Total no. of PoP and
irrelevant posts
No. of days
PoP

369.171
58.895

121.530
68.983

0
0

965
1222

293.513
31.058

185.182
74.453

0
0

1304
2075

86.554

46.874

0

259

28.728

20.770

0

123

4.517

6.983

0

67

5.044

5.384

0

50

Ratio of PoP

0.444

0.322

0

1

0.276

0.181

0

1

No. of post users
No. of new users
Total no. of PoP and
irrelevant posts
No. of days

35.144
7.326

43.913
13.183

0
0

173
250

86.625
13.914

41.985
20.062

0
0

289
274

13.128

19.099

0

132

17.448

13.457

0

119

2191

1900

Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Model 2
Forum

Variable

Pre-enforcement
Std. Dev.
Min

Mean
A

No. of PoP by group i
No. of days

3.318
928.838

No. of new joined users

B

5.827
536.729

51382.390 42310.450

No. of group users
No. of irrelevant posts by
other groups
No. of PoP by other
groups
No. of irrelevant replies
by other groups
No. of replies on
protection by other
groups
No. of groups
No. of PoP by group i
No. of days
No. of new joined users
No. of group users
No. of irrelevant posts by
other groups
No. of PoP by other
groups
No. of irrelevant replies
by other groups
No. of replies on
protection by other
groups
No. of groups

63.726

63.489

0.000
1.000
52.000
1.000

65374.250 41430.920

48.000

2998.267

1.000

2242.678

Max

Mean

148.000
0.194
2067.000
928.838
117386.00
28065.040
0
1222.000
63.726
118346.00
23910.240
0

Post-enforcement
Std. Dev.
Min

Max

1.299
536.729

0.000
1.000

32.000
2067.000

9504.100

63.000

42209.000

63.489

1.000

1222.000

8325.205

52.000

31491.000

275.272

1.000

1093.000

863592.00 391994.90 140379.30
0
0
0

594.000

5257020

6117.000

850.834

545692.70 277299.50
0
0

604.000

17938.680 12036.800

8.000

34119.000

6786.086

2217.158

27.000

8521.000

4.198
680.933
5716.440
6.837

22.303
393.632
2323.887
12.807

0.000
1.000
5.000
1.000

1842
352.000
0.472
1612.000
680.933
8328.000 10467.150
250.000
6.837

6.299
393.632
6682.378
12.807

0.000
1.000
4.000
1.000

201.000
1612.000
27024.000
250.000

8297.601

2683.673

2.000

10075.000

9239.056

6110.914

17.000

23187.000

3995.307

1453.264

9.000

5285.000

3577.674

2162.968

10.000

7568.000

49332.82

15094.300

56.000

58218.000 96695.570 46176.240

87.000

170131.00
0

13505.490

4494.019

46.000

17269.000 20892.090 10265.840

43.000

36383.000

1217

Table 4. The Estimation Result of Model 1
(1)
Forum A
VARIABLES

No. PoP

(2)
Forum A
Stage 1 of
Heckman
Is there any post?

(3)
Forum A
Stage 2 of
Heckman
Ratio of PoP

(4)
Forum B
No. PoP

(5)
Forum B
Stage 1 of
Heckman
Is there any post?

(6)
Forum B
Stage 2 of
Heckman
Ratio of PoP
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The Enforcement
indicator
No. of new users
No. of post users
No. of PoP at day t-1
Total no. of posts on
protection or irrelevant
posts at day t-1
Linear time trend
Constant
Observations
Adj. R-squared

0.239***
(0.058)
0.0274*
(0.017)
0.107***
(0.022)
0.215***
(0.021)

-1.056***
(0.288)
-0.115***
(0.032)
1.017***
(0.092)

0.038***
(0.009)
2.49e-06
(0.002)
0.030***
(0.004)
0.0250***
(0.003)

-0.655***
(0.005)

-0.060***
(0.004)

-0.426***
(0.062)
-0.0236
(0.017)
0.399***
(0.020)
0.303***
(0.021)

Inc.
Inc.
Inc.
Inc.
0.707***
0.122
0.151***
-0.301***
(0.133)
(0.405)
(0.022)
(0.046)
2,191
2,191
2,191
1,900
0.531
0.171
0.519
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.460
(0.371)
-0.352***
(0.103)
1.241***
(0.107)

0.051**
(0.024)
0.000755
(0.007)
-0.059***
(0.011)
0.097***
(0.013)

0.193***
(0.058)

-0.079***
(0.014)

Inc.
-1.634***
(0.163)
1,900
0.239

Inc.
0.739***
(0.026)
1,900

Table 5. The Estimation Result of Model 2
(1)
Forum A

VARIABLES

No. PoP

(2)
Forum A
Stage 1 of
Heckman
Is there any
post?

Fixed -effect

(5)
Forum B

No. PoP

Fixed -effect

OLS

Fixed -effect

0.059***
(0.025)

-0.925***
(0.143)

-2.976***
(0.359)

-0.188**
(0.082)

0.060***
(0.019)
-0.007
(0.004)
0.018
(0.012)
-0.102*
(0.052)

-1.978***
(0.271)

-1.213
(0.946)

0.286***
(0.0669

9.449***
(0.460)

3.526**
(1.533)

-2.855***
(0.334)

-0.651
(0.765)

1.556***
(0.121)

No. of PoP by
other groups
No. of replies on
protection by other
groups
No. of irrelevant
posts by other
groups
No. of irrelevant
replies by other
groups
the inverse Mills
ratio
Constant

Number of groups

(4)
Forum A
Stage 2 of
Heckman
Ratio of PoP

-1.339***
(0.391)
-1.120***
(0.212)
-1.661***
(0.190)
0.0172
(1.051)

Enforce law
indicator
No. of users in
group i
No. of days

Observations
R-squared

(3)
Forum A
Stage 2 of
Heckman
Ratio of PoP

-17.0***

-8.596***

(2.537)
3,684
0.695

(2.369)
3,684

1,842

(6)
Forum B
Stage 1 of
Heckman
Is there any
post?

(7)
Forum B
Stage 2 of
Heckman
Ratio of PoP

(8)
Forum B
Stage 2 of
Heckman
Ratio of PoP

Fixed -effect

OLS

-0.408***
(0.153)

-0.912***
(0.368)

-2.341**
(0.332)
1.039***
(0.075)
0.287
(0.222)
0.423
(0.727)

-0.0729
(0.308)

-0.365***
(0.110)
0.049*
(0.030)
0.308***
(0.062)
-0.157
(0.221)

0.138***
(0.0462)

-0.548
(0.520)

-1.985**
(1.011)

-0.381
(0.398)

0.0739
(0.270)

0.0837**
(0.116)

0.106
(0.072)

0.783***
(0.262)

-0.962**
(0.489)

-0.274
(0.227)

-0.217
(0.175)

-0.269**
(0.080)

-0.153***
(0.044)

1.032**
(0.495)

3.100***
(0.796)

0.950**
(0.379)

0.192
(0.228)

-1.705**

-5.557***

0.020
(0.029)
-0.563

-0.029
(0.020)
-0.405

(0.966)
2,434
0.265

(1.483)
2,434

(1.152)
897
0.080

(0.501)
897

709

709

-0.003**
(0.002)
1.238*
(0.657)
2,960
0.046

-0.002*
(0.001)
0.377***
(0.116)
2,960

1,842
1,771
1,771
1,217
1,217
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6. Summary Statistics for PoP
Old Users

Forum
A
B

New Users

Mean

Standard Error

Mean

Standard Error

0.473
1.254

0.028
0.067

0.511
3.428

0.030
0.117
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